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RETHINKING THE RIGHT OF
EMPLOYERS TO TERMINATE
AT-WILL EMPLOYEES
L. STEVEN PLArr*

"At-will" employees have recently been given a legal basis
for suing their employers for wrongful discharge.' It remains to
be seen whether this right is real or illusory. Like the Emperor's
due to
new clothes, the trappings of this new legal doctrine may,
2
judicial intransigence, prove more apparent than real.
The United States is one of the few industrialized nations
providing minimal protection for employees working under an
employment contract terminable at will.3 Employers of at-will
employees have, historically, been able to discharge their employees without notice or cause.4 This contrasts sharply with
* J.D. Loyola University, 1978; B.A. Northwestern University, 1975; Associate with Arnold & Kadjan, Chicago, Ill. The author wishes to express
his thanks to John Toomey and Gerald Meehan for their assistance in the

preparation of this article.
2d 124, 421
1. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.

N.E.2d 876 (1981). See also discussion concerning recent decisions infra
notes 10-46 and accompanying text. The difficulty plaintiffs may have in applying Palmateerto their situations was recently demonstrated by the Cook
County Circuit Court's refusal to apply Palmateerto a situation in which an
employee was discharged for reporting embezzlement. Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Co. Inc., Civ. No. 81-7654 (Cir. Ct. Cook County filed April 13, 1981),
appealfiled, No. 81-2732 (1st Dist. 1981).
2. See Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951) (oral promise of bonus not enforced); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan.
52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (company manual indicating dismissals only for
"good cause" not enforced); Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So.
2d 28 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (oral promise of job security not enforced); Note,
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc- Total Actionfor RetaliatoryDischarge Upon Filing
Workmen's Compensation Claim, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & Poc. 659, 664-65
(1979). See generally, Note, ProtectingAt- Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HAv. L. REV.
1816 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal:
Time For a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508 (1976). See generally Peck, Unjust DischargesFrom Employment. A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1979).
4. Employees working in the private sector are protected by arbitration provisions which have been held to be enforceable by the courts. See

Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Peerless Laun-

dry Co., 51 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 331 (1968) (Eaton Arb.); Keeny Mfg. Co., 40 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 974 (1963) (Donnelly, Arlio, Arbs.). See generally M. TROrA,

230-38 (1974). Civil Service
employees are governed by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.
ARBrrRATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES
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the rules governing collective bargaining agreements which generally provide that employees can only be discharged for "just
cause." 5 The rules governing at-will employment are beginning
to swing in this direction as a greater percentage of Americans
6
are being hired on an at-will basis.
The common law rule permitting employers to indiscriminately discharge at-will employees has come under attack. Both
commentators and courts are finding the common law distinction between protected and at-will employees indefensible. 7 Recently, some courts have implied that at-will employees can only
be terminated in good faith.8 Others have either inferred job duration terms or imposed tort liability to protect employees
against abusive or retaliatory discharge. 9 Unfortunately, neither
courts nor commentators have been able to develop a coherent
doctrine for the imposition of tort or contract liability concerning at-will employees. This failure could lead to judicial unwillingness to either enforce or broaden an "at-will doctrine."
This article will examine the underlying basis for the development of what will hereafter be referred to as the "at-will doc§ 7503 (Supp. H 1978). For a discussion concerning the range of protection
available to government employees, see J. WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 9-19, 45-65 (2d ed. 1973). Constitutional protections can
also be invoked. See generally, Lowy, ConstitutionalLimitationson the Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1976).
5. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Forrer
v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967); LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT §

149 (2d ed. 1913); S. W-

LISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. 1957).
6. The strength of unions in America has never been weaker than it is
today with union workers malking up a smaller and smaller percentage of
the work force as a whole. Recent census reports indicate that between
60% and 65% of all Americans are now hired on an at-will basis with only
22% in the private sector and only 15% in the public sector being members
of an employee union. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
COMEMRCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979, at 427 (Table 704) (union employed); id. at 392 (Table 644) (total labor force); id. at
313 (Table 509) (government employees). See also, supra note 3.
7. See Peck, supra note 3; Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights, N.Y.U. 22d ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (1970); Note, A
Common Law Actionfor the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1435 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Abusive Discharge]; Note, Implied
ContractRights to Job Security, 26 STANFORD L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Job Security ].For an informative article advocating statutory reform as opposed to common law change, see Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
8. See Fortune v. National Cash Reg. Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Payne v. AHFI/Netherlands, B.V., 522 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton
v. Central Ind.Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hocks, 272
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.
Va. 1978).
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trine" by examining recent decisions in this area and their
historical antecedents. The parameters of the at-will doctrine
will be assessed in light of modern contract and tort principles.
Finally, there will be a discussion of whether the creation of job
security rights for at-will employees is better handled in either a
judicial or statutory framework.
RECENT DECISIONS

The Palmateer and Kelsay Decisions
Recent decisions have held that an employee who is engaged in an at-will employment relationship can only be discharged when the reason for the discharge does not contravene
public policy.10 In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,"
the Illinois Supreme Court held that a discharge is in derrogation of public policy when it strikes "at the heart of a citizen's
social rights, duties, and responsibilities." 12 To plead his cause,
the victim of wrongful discharge need only allege "that the employer discharge[d] the employee in retaliation for the employee's activities, and that the discharge [was] in
13
contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. '
Palmateerrepresents the logical outgrowth of an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,14 which,
for the first time, recognized retaliatory discharge as a cause of
action in Illinois. In Kelsay, the plaintiff had filed a workmen's
compensation suit after being told by her employer that if she
did so, she would be terminated. After ffling the claim, Kelsay
was terminated. She then filed a lawsuit for retaliatory discharge and was awarded $1,000.00 in compensatory damages and
$25,000.00 in punitive damages.
The Kelsay court, in examining the Workmen's Compensation Act, found that its policy did not preclude a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge even though the Act ostensibly functions as the exclusive remedy for actions against the employer.
10. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 III. 2d 124, 421

N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IM. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978). See also supra note 9.
11. 85 Ill.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).

12. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
13. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). For a comparison of how the
14. 74 Ill.
Kelsay opinion distinguishes previous court rulings in Illinois, compare
2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473
Kelsay, id., with Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill.
(1976) (criminal penalties in the Illinois Age Discrimination Act, ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 48, §§ 881-887 (1975) were exclusive and did not allow a cause of
action for damages). See also Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1977).
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The court recognized that an action in tort exists for employees
terminated for filing a workmen's compensation claim. Further,
the court held that '"punitive damages [could] properly be
5
awarded in cases such as [Kelsay] for retaliatory discharge.'
Cases In Other Jurisdictions
Palmateer and Kelsay followed the approach taken by
courts in a number of jurisdictions which allow at-will employees great latitude in actions against their former employers for
wrongful discharge. These rulings can generally be grouped
into three categories: those requiring employers to discharge atwill employees in good faith;16 those developing implied-in-fact
promises of employment for a specified duration; 17 and those
imposing tort obligations protecting employees against abusive
or retaliatory discharge. 18
The first of these approaches, the good faith approach, has
been used by courts in the First and Second Circuits. 19 Recovery stems from the tortured view that at-will employment
15. 74 Ill. 2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361 (1978). See supra note 14. Taken
together, the Kelsay and Palmateer decisions yield the conclusion that it

may no longer be realistic to view an employment contract as terminable at
will unless otherwise agreed. Another question which is raised by these
two decisions is whether a business in Illinois can insure itself against the
risk of a wrongful discharge suit and punitive damages stemming therefrom. A recent Illinois decision held that public policy prohibits insurance
for punitive damages. See Beaver v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 95 Ill. App. 3d
1122, 420 N.E.2d 1058 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1977); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974); Zimmer
v. Wells Management Corp., 348 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d
184, 189, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (1959).

17. Some commentators have correctly noted that the search for additional consideration seems highly artificial and runs contrary to the traditional rule that courts should not inquire into the adequacy of

consideration. See J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 4-3,
at 136 (2d ed. 1977). The logical conclusion, therefore, is that anything more

than nominal consideration supplied by the employee is sufficient to support all of the employer's promises, including the employer's expressed and
implied promise not to discharge his at-will employees unjustly. See 3A.L.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 684, at 224 (1960). For cases on point, see Grauer v.
Valve &Primer Corp., 47 111.App. 3d 152, 154-55, 361 N.E.2d 863, 865-66 (1977)
(letter from employer establishing implied promise of job for a definite period); Carter v. Bradlee, 245 A.D. 49, 280 N.Y.S. 368 (1935), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 667,
200 N.E. 48 (1936); Delzell v. Pope, 200 Tenn. 641, 651, 294 S.W.2d 690, 694
(1956) (implying an employment for a fixed term).
18. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86
Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970) (en banc); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140,
355 N.E.2d 315 (1976). The jurisdictions adopting the tort approach with the
public policy exception include California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ore-

gon and West Virginia. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 16.
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sounds in contract law. In Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co. ,20 and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. ,21 the courts restricted atwill employers to discharges performed in good faith. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held, in Fortune, that the
plaintiff's at-will employment was based on a contract that contained an implied covenant of good faith. 22 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court reached the same result while relying on
slightly different reasoning. That court imposed a good faith
limitation based on public policy concerning labor relations in
the state.23 While the New Hampshire Supreme Court appears
to be unique in applying such a rationale, the good faith require24
ment is in accord with other decisions.
A second group of courts has retained the traditional, formalistic position that an employer is generally able to terminate
an at-will employee without justification. This group, however,
has allowed at-will employees greater opportunity to overcome
the obstacle imposed by the traditional view by inferring implied-in-fact promises that the employment would be for a specified duration. 2 5 While this logic is somewhat strained,
employees have, under the implied-in-fact theory, succeeded by
showing some clear measure of detrimental reliance such as a
long distance move or a loss of some job opportunity, based on
their belief that the employment would continue for a longer,
specified period of time.2 6 In some instances the courts have interpreted the forebearance of some opportunity as constituting
separate consideration for the promise of employment for a
specified duration. 27 These courts do not, however, appear
20. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
21. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
22. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1970); cf. U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its

performance or enforcement.").
23. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that an absolute right to
discharge would violate public policy. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.

24. See supra note 16.
25. See supra note 17.
26. See, e.g., O'Neill v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978)

(plaintiff left defendant's competitor relying on a promise that he eventually would be promoted); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich.
App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979) (plaintiff left defendant's competitor relying

on promise of full job security); Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Co., 387 Pa.
393, 127 A.2d 687 (1956) (plaintiff sacrificed other job opportunity in reliance
on new job security).

27. See Brawthen v. H. &R. Block, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 131, 104 Cal. Rptr.
486 (1972); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971);
Chinn v. China Nat'l Av. Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955) (held
that plaintiff's reliance on defendant's inducements constituted sufficient
consideration).
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ready to interpret statements in company personnel handbooks
28
as constituting a promise of some degree of job security.
The most logical approach, used by yet a third group of
courts, has imposed tort liabilities on employers who wrongfully
discharge at-will employees. Palmateer,along with a number of
courts throughout the country, takes this view. 29 In Agis v. HowardJohnson Co.,30 waitresses were fired in alphabetical order in
an attempt by the restaurant manager to determine who was
withholding information concerning the pilfering of food. The
court held that such "extreme and outrageous" conduct gave
rise to a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
31
harm.
The Agis court could have rendered its decision by applying
conventional tort law rather than using the at-will doctrine.
Other courts, however, have addressed the issue directly by
finding tort liability based on a "public policy exception" to the
traditional terminable-at-will rule. The leading decision in this
area is Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396.32
In Petermann, the defendant instructed his employees to
commit perjury at a legislative hearing. An at-will employee refused and was fired. The California Court of Appeals, in ruling
for the employee, held that the employer's conduct jeopardized
public policy and, therefore, constituted an abuse of the at-will
right to terminate.33 The Kelsay and Palmateer decisions are
the logical outgrowth of the Petermann decision and in some
34
ways represent the cutting edge in this area of the law.
28. Compare Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d
213 (1962) (internal corporate memorandum held not to constitute continuing offer) and Neth v. General Elec. Co., 65 Wash. 2d 652, 399 P,2d 314 (1965)

(oral representations made by an employer during a union election campaign held not to be enforceable promises) with Greene v. Howard U., 412
F.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (contractual obligation created by reliance
on faculty handbook) and Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494

(Mo. 1971) (policy regarding severance pay outlined in manual held enforceable promise).
29. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970); Glenn v.
Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769
(1961); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976);
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (en banc). See
also Comment, Protectingthe Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows

the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinantsof Public Policy,
1977 Wis. L. REV. 777, 797.
30. 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
31. Id. at 145, 355 N.E.2d at 319.
32. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). Petermann has been distinguished, however, as a contract action. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 152 Cal. Rptr. 52, 54-55 (Ct. App. 1979).
33. 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
34. See supra note 29.
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Other courts have adopted the public policy rationale. One
court has sustained an employee's tort action against an employer who fired the at-will employee for serving on a jury.35 Another held that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee
who had notified his superiors at a bank of customer credit pro36
tection law violations.
The difficulty with these decisions is that while they cite
public policy as the rationale for denying employers the right to
terminate employees at will, the decisions have not adequately
defined the parameters of the public policy rationale. Palmateer
is particularly deficient in this respect and, without further clarification, allows for potentially frivolous and even vindictive lawsuits. This caveat was articulately expressed by Justice
Underwood in his dissent in Kelsay:
Henceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an
employee may be, if he has filed a compensation claim against an
employer, that employer may thereafter discharge him only at the
risk of being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory discharge
and unlimited punitive damages, which could
well severely impair
37
or destroy the solvency of small businesses.
While this view is unduly pessimistic, in light of the right of a
defendant in Illinois to demand good faith pleadings 38 and a
more definite statement of the cause,3 9 it identifies a very real
concern in retaliatory discharge actions.
Possibly in response to this concern, a number of jurisdictions frame the public policy exception in the narrowest of
terms. 40 In Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,41 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, over a strong dissent, that no
clear public policy had been violated by the discharge of a salesman who had alerted his superiors to a potential defect in their
product, and had objected to marketing the same. 42 Similarly,
employees have been prevented from utilizing the at-will doc35. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
36. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
37. 74 Ill. 2d at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (1978) (Underwood, J., dissenting).
38. See Section 42 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, which provides that a
pleading is not "bad in substance" when it "informs the opposite party of
the nature of the claim." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 42 (1956).
39. See Section 45 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, which addresses itself to defects apparent on the face of the complaint. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 45 (1956).

40. See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 646, 152 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1979).
41. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). Judge Roberts, in his dissent, argued
that society's interest in protection against unsafe products warranted recognition of a cause of action.
42. 456 Pa. at 175, 319 A.2d 178-79.
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trine when discharged for refusing to falsify medical records, 43
when objecting to participation in a price-fixing plan,4 4 and
when disputing inaccurate corporate representations to the fed45
eral government.
While courts have developed a variety of exceptions to the
traditional at-will termination right, only the public policy avenue appears to hold real promise, and even that approach has
been marked by a distinct lack of clarity. The common thread
running through these decisions is general dissatisfaction with
the traditional at-will rule. Clearly, the courts recognize that the
historical foundation for the at-will rules is insufficient to justify
continued recognition of an absolute right of termination in
favor of employers.
ORIGIN OF THE AT-WILL RULE AFFECTING EMPLOYERS

As derived from Anglo-Saxon tradition, employment arrangements in America were originally viewed as status-based
relationships; the duties and responsibilities of master and servant were imposed. 46 With the advent of the industrial revolution, this provincial outlook was recast in terms of an emerging
contract theory. Instead of the master being responsible for the
servants' health, welfare and well-being, the new approach held
the employer responsible for only the terms specified in the employment contract. 47 Those not hired for a definite period of
time were presumed to serve at the employer's pleasure. 48 The
at-will rule at that time epitomized the changing nature of the
employment relationship, from one that was very personal in
nature to one that was highly impersonal.
43. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).

44. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 646, 152 Cal. Rptr. 52
(1979).
45. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976). See
also supra note 1.
46. See, e.g., P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 123-30
(1969) [hereinafter cited as P. SELZNICK]; Feinman, The Development ofthe
Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-22 (1976). For an in
depth discussion of the master's obligations in 19th-century America, see 2
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 258-66 (1884).

47. See, e.g., H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

§ 134, at 272 (1977). See also Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. 49, 57
(1842); I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.30, at 25-28 (1978).
48. See generally R. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY 194 (1976); Note,
Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107
(1942). For a discussion concerning the demise of the contract reasoning
theories see Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the
Nineteenth Century: The TransformationofProperty, Contract and Tort, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1529-37 (1980).
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The courts, in viewing the employment contract, applied the
traditional, formalistic concept that was in vogue in the early
19th Century: manifestation of assent coupled with evidence of
a definite, express term. 49 The at-will rule required a definite,
express contract term to enforce a claim of wrongful discharge.
As the courts later discovered, however, this approach allowed
employers to act with complete, and sometimes abused,
50
discretion.
At the turn of the century the laissez-faire attitude toward
employment relationships reached its high-water mark in Adair
v. United States,5 1 and Coppage v. Kansas.52 However, even in
these decisions, the Court noted a growing concern by legislators that the concept of freedom of contract between the employer and employee was a cruel illusion because of the
disparity in bargaining power between the two.53
The Adair and Coppage decisions were modified by the
Supreme Court in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 54 and NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.55 In these decisions, the Court
recognized that some restrictions should be placed on employer
autonomy. The Court in Jones & Laughlin was especially concerned about the problems encountered by employees who
worked for abusive employers.5 6
Since the turn of the century, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of regulations governing the working environment and protecting individual workers.5 7 Initially, these
regulations developed as a response to the gradually increasing
power of unions.5 8 Today such regulations arise in response to
the needs of the general workforce and exist to control discrimi49. See supra note 48.
50. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 46, at 131.
51. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

52. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
53. 236 U.S. at 40-42. For a discussion of the disparity in the bargaining
THE NEW COMMONWEALTH 1877-1890, at 147-56, 174-76 (1968).
54. 313 U.S. 177, 177-87 (1941).

power at the turn of the century in America, see J. GARRATY,
55. 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).

56. Id. See generally Cohen, The Basis of Contract,46 HARv. L. REv. 553
(1933); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-anEssay in Perspective, 40 YALE

L.J. 704 (1931).
57. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976); LaborManagement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-189
(1976); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976); Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1962).
58. See generally W. MALONE, M.
RELATION

539-49 (1974).
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nation in hiring and firing. 59 They also provide a minimum level
of security for workers with seniority and those approaching retirement age. 60 All these developments evidence a shift from
the laizzez-faire attitude prevailing at the end of the 19th Cenretury, to one that creates mutual expectations and imposes
61
employee.
the
and
employer
the
both
on
sponsibilities
AT-WILL DOCTRINES

Contract Principles

As discussed previously, some courts have expressed the
belief that the employment relationship is the outgrowth of contractual bargaining. Underlying this theory is the questionable
assumption that each party knows what best serves his interests
and, moreover, that each is in a position to freely negotiate on
behalf of those interests. One view, critical of this approach,
suggests that when the parties are in unequal bargaining positions, traditional contract theories cannot apply.62 Courts which

adopt this view have utilized "judicial interference" as a balancing force to eliminate unconscionable terms or conditions imposed by the stronger party. 63 Courts which adhere to the
judicial intervention approach view the bargaining situation as
one in which the employer offers the job on a take-it-or-leave-itbasis, allowing the employee virtually no latitude within which
to negotiate. The resulting employment relationship allows the
employer to terminate the employee solely at the employer's
discretion. Contract theory courts view such terminable-at-will
employee redress
contracts as unconscionable, thus permitting
64
under traditional contract theories.
59. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2,000e-2 (1976).
60. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) (1976).

61. See I.C. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON
§ 359 (2d ed. 1913); 9 S. WILISTON, A

vANT

THE LAW OF MASTER AND SER-

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-

TRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d ed. 1967); see also Odell v. Humble Oil &Ref. Co.,
201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Forrer v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967).
62. See, e.g., Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943); Comment, Employment At Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211, 236-38
(1973).
63. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
64. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 235 (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1970); U.C.C. § 2-302 (unconscionability). The difficulty with this approach
is that it does not address the central issue of the at-will employment relationship. That issue is the inherently unequal position that the employer
has in relation to the employee. See Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Unequal
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In viewing the at-will employment relationship as involving
an implied or express contract, courts often contradict themselves. On the one hand, they reform contracts to equalize bargaining positions; on the other hand, they assume that the
parties are fully aware of the risks and have assumed those
risks. In fact, the at-will employee probably knows a lot less
about the strength or weakness of his bargaining position than
does an employee represented by a union. It is likely that if the
emimplied contract theory prevailed, employers would require
65
ployees to sign waivers regarding wrongful discharge.
The lack of bargaining power and insecurity inherent in an
at-will arrangement contrasts sharply with the job security guaranteed by collective bargaining. Theoretically, the union acts
not only as an information-gathering force, but also as a protector against wrongful discharge. 66 According to a recent estimate, roughly ninety percent of the collective bargaining
agreements now in force in the United States limit the power of
the employer to discharge employees. 67 Unions can also be expected to negotiate on all other terms concerning the employment relationship, particularly such elements as the duration of
the contract and the requirement that the contract be termi68
nated only in good faith.
Tort Principles
From a theoretical standpoint, a tort theory approach makes
more sense than a contract theory approach. The tort approach
views the employer as owing his employees a duty to deal with
BargainingPower: Post-BenthamiteEconomics in the House of Lords, 29 U.

TORONTO L. J. 359, 382-83 (1976). But see Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9
N.Y.2d 329, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 174 N.E.2d 463 (1961) (employee bargained for

job security and arbitration).
To a certain extent, the at-will employee has the discretion to either

accept the job on the terms offered or seek employment elsewhere. By attempting to balance the unequal bargaining power of the parties by judicial
interference, the courts will never change the over-all bargaining positions
of the parties except on a fragmentary and interstital basis. On occasion,
employees are able to negotiate effective contractual protection, but these
examples are few and far between. See Keating v. BBDO Int'l, Inc., 438 F.2d
676 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Geib v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 419 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936).
65. See generally Summers, "Good Faith"in General ContractLaw and

the Sales Provisionsof the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195,
216-52 (1968).
66. See 2 Collective Bargaining, Negotiation & Contracts (BNA) 40:1
(1979).
67. Id.
68. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 166 (1972).
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them fairly and in good faith. 69 By breaching this duty the employer opens himself up to liability for damages, i.e., compensation for the employee's cost and inconvenience of searching for
a new job, family stress and embarrassment from loss of
70
status.
The difficulty with imposing tort liability is definitional.
Lacking clearly delineated limits to the right of action for retaliatory discharge, the courts are faced with the task of weeding out
71
or preventing frivolous, even vindictive, litigation.
The courts have addressed this concern by limiting the tort
to -discharges which violate "public policy. '72 Unfortunately,
73
this public policy limitation has not been precisely defined.
Some jurisdictions have held that public policy is that which is
to be found in the constitution or statutes of the state where the
case arises. 74 Others have held that public policy is that which
either conflicts with present-day morals, or contravenes an es75
tablished societal interest.
Illinois law, under Kelsay and Palmateer,defines public policy as being, at least, those acts which strike "at the heart of a
citizen's social rights, duties and responsibilities. '76 There is a
sound basis in those decisions for utilizing a policy approach.
The preamble to the United States Constitution addresses itself
69. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 179, 384 N.E.2d 353, 356
(1979).

See also UNITED STATES MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 4-6 (1980).

The imposition of tort liability would help to spread more equitably the
costs and risks of wrongful discharge. To a certain degree, the costs to employers who arbitrarily discharge employees involve a waste of training and
a loss of both manpower, continuity in the work force, and expertise. The
imposition of tort liability shifts some of the risks equally among both employers and employees. See infra note 71.
70. See Katz & Hight, The Economics of Unemployment Insurance: A
Symposium, 30 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 431 (1977).

71. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). See supra note 37.
72. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981); see Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); see
also Abusive Discharge,supra note 7, at 1441-42.
73. See England, Recent Developments in Wrongful DismissalLaws and
Some PointersFor Reform, 16 ALTA. L. REV. 470, 501-02 (1978); Job Security,
supra note 7, at 363.
74. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). See also Comment, Protectingthe Private Sector At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977
WIs. L. REV. 777, 797.
75. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
76. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). But see Petrik v. Monarch Printing Co. Inc., Civ. No. 81-7654 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County filed April 3, 1981), appeal filed, No. 81-2732 (lst Dist. 1981).
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to principles of justice, domestic tranquility and general welfare.
Similarly, the Bill of Rights establishes the foundation of the
American criminal justice system. As part of the criminal justice system, it is in the best interest of society to encourage individuals having knowledge of criminal activity to come forward
and assist law enforcement agencies. While governments are
constituted to secure the rights of the people and to protect
property, 77 the people have a corresponding duty to provide information concerning violations of the law. 78 The court in
Palmateer addressed itself to this consideration and held that
the defendant, International Harvester Company, violated public policy by discharging Ray Palmateer for providing information to the police concerning criminal conduct by an
79
International Harvester employee.
A similar approach was followed in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters80 where the California court
held that it violated public policy for the defendant to discharge
an employee for refusing to give perjured testimony:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary
to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the employment be for a designated
or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee declined
[T]o
to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute ....
fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil
law... must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal
to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without reason and
contrary to the spirit of the law .... 81
Other courts, focusing on the public policy concept, have
reached similar conclusions.
In contrast, where no clear public policy interest has been
violated, courts have been reluctant to intervene.8 2 Judicial reluctance has been particularly strong when the dispute involves
internal management affairs. 83 Where the internal dispute in77. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 23.
78. Id.
79. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876

(1981).
80. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1979).
81. Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 27.
82. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976);
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 646, 152 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1979).
83. Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951) (oral promise);
Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (company manual); Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28 (La. Ct.
App. 1975) (oral promise of job security). See also Comment, Kelsay v. Mo-
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volves a difference of opinion regarding planning and design
matters, however, courts have intervened when the decision
would have a substantial impact on the general public.8 4 Aside
from the public policy limitation, courts viewing wrongful discharge in the tort 5context have not developed any consistent
8
theme or purpose.
JOB SECURITY

What is the most feasible manner by which at-will employees can be protected? It is submitted that employee job security
would be better protected by statute than by judicial decision.
As discussed above, courts have had great difficulty in deciding whether the concept of wrongful discharge is better handied as an implied contract or as a tort. While the tort approach
has proved more workable, courts applying tort principles to the
concept of wrongful discharge have had difficulty applying the
86
public policy rationale.
A better approach would be to review the experience of
other industrialized nations. West Germany, for example, has
rejected the concept that the employer of an at-will employee
can discharge his workers with impunity. Instead, it has imposed broad standards prohibiting "unjust discharges. '87 To enforce this policy against unjust discharges, special labor
88
tribunals have been created to review cases of alleged abuse.
Similarly, Japan guarantees workers in large firms a lifetime of
job security; 89 workers in smaller firms are protected by stattorola, Inc.: Tort Action for Retaliatory Discharge Upon Filing Workmen's

Compensation Claims, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC.& PRoc. 659, 664-65 (1979).
84. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 185, 319 A.2d 174, 180
(1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Reuther v. Fowler &Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 356 A.2d 119 (1978). See also Perry v. Hark Mountain Corp., Civ.
No. IP 81-631-C (S.D. Ind. April 28, 1982).
85. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1404-06 (1967); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174

(1974); see also Hinrichs vs. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977)
(Jones, J., dissenting).
87. AN ACTION TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST UNWARRANTED DISMISSALS, BGB1 499 (1951); G. HALLETT, THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF WEST GERMANY, 90 (1973).
88. See H. ROBERTS, V.H. OKAIOTO & G. LODGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND
JAPAN,

75-84 (1979)

[hereinafter cited as ROBERTS, OKAMOTO & LODGE, COL-

LECTIVE BARGAINING].

89. Id. See E.
(1979).

VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER 1: LESSONS FOR AMERICA,

131-57
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ute. 90 Those who view Japan's post-war economic miracle with
envy have pointed to job security as a contributing factor in the
high degree of worker productivity. 9 1
In this country, statutory standards could be adopted pro92
viding protections similar to those under the Civil Service Act.
The standards might focus on such factors as good faith, length
of service, job performance and valid employer criteria such as
economic conditions or employer needs. 93 A system of arbitration could be developed similar to that which currently exists in
94
such areas as labor relations and employment discrimination.
To avoid frivolous charges, employees could be required to
demonstrate either bad faith in termination or good faith on the
part of the party bringing the action. A statutory approach
would apprise both the employer and the employee of their respective rights and duties. Such a framework would stabilize
employment relationships and might increase employee loyalty.
The judicial approach is likely to be ineffective because the
doctrine would be defined by slowly developing case law.9 5 This
process has, thus far, produced varying and sometimes inconsistent interpretations of the parameters of the at-will doctrine.
With their superior financial position, employers could, through
protected and costly litigation, utilize these varying judicial decisions to distort the intent and meaning of the doctrine. Prospective plaintiffs are likely to be prevented from exercising
their new-found rights, through either outright rejection of the
wrongful discharge concept, 96 or by emasculation of the
97
doctrine.
90. See Rodo Kkjunho (Labor Code), Law No. 49 of 1947, Art. 20; Judgment of Sept. 24, 1956, Dist. Ct., Tokyo, 7 Rominsho 957 (Collected Labor
and Civil Code Cases).

91.

ROBERTS, OKAMOTO & LODGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra

note

88.
92.
93.
94.
95.

TY

See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (Supp. II 1978).
See generally B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 784-86 (2d ed. 1977).
D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION 38 (1977).
See T. CUMMINGS &E. MoLLOY, REPORTING PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALIOF WORK LIFE, 103-09 (1977); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE,

128-55 (2d rev. ed. 1971). One of the problems sought to be alleviated by the
courts in recognizing unjust termination as a viable cause of action, is the
unfair bargaining position of the employers, vis-A-vis, the employee. See
Tobriner &Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1247, 1266-81 (1967).
96. Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (Ala. 1977).
97. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:633

CONCLUSION

While courts have recognized that at-will employees have
certain rights protecting them against wrongful discharge, application of the at-will doctrine has been inconsistent. Indeed, if
there is a pattern to the decisions dealing with wrongful discharge, it is that those courts applying tort concepts have defined the tort in terms of public policy. Although the public
policy limitation appears to be a promising approach, it is invoked in but a handful of jurisdictions. 98 Those seeking to avail
themselves of this newly created right must be aware that, in
the absence of statutory intervention, the likelihood of success
is not great, and that at this time the right, like the Emperor's
new clothes, may be more illusory than real.

98. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Brown v. Transcon Lines,
284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (en banc); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).

